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MagicMouse.sys

Malicious Microsoft Windows Hardware Compatibility Publisher 2026-06-09 04:01 VT 1/71
Driver Name
MagicMouse.sys
MD5
1534f0c0ab20aa01af64a923ff01a123
SHA1
a4ce500aa05e05d5bc05f047751c756ff778da4d
SHA256
0a3ec61c94cb96e1f8cb0ff9c8f8390fb28da8b95655d4e7df0ec22c7819b9ac
Imphash
c6ee425937417ea20adbc8b6779ac96f
Vhash
015066556d1516151jz1xz
Authentihash
033d4af03b396028bbde5e971a1a50eeea336bda577c49c17998cc0a54e25774
Rich PE header hash
382c954837b8206f43427d58006a4220
SSDEEP
3072:BcCvrgKU8GI53ZsUbOH/CTkN3HorhDfcCy4KpW:BcCvrPl51SH/CTiolDfcCzZ
TLSH
T120D39E92518903E3C93699F0DBA18EC37CB4B417D350D9EB86D0653628E6DC0BE3E7A5
Signer
Microsoft Windows Hardware Compatibility Publisher
Signing date
2026-06-09 04:01
SpcSpOpusInfo
Langtu Digital
VT detections
1/71
Compilation time
2026-06-08
PDB path
MagicMouse.pdb
Country submitter
China, Vietnam, United States
Flag
Malicious

Description

Functionality: A signed kernel Loader driver that loads a hidden second stage, disables Windows driver signature enforcement, and then erases its own traces.

- Hidden payload: The driver imports only one function, MmGetSystemRoutineAddress, and resolves every other API at runtime from XOR-obfuscated strings. Its real payload is a 108 KB PE image stored in .rdata with the normal MZ/PE header removed, so it evades signature and entropy scanning.

- Signature bypass: Once loaded, the payload finds and patches g_CiOptions in CI.dll (Code Integrity), which lets unsigned kernel code load.

- Cleanup: It removes its own entry from the PnP driver-load table and force-deletes its own file from disk.