Fsfilter2.sys
- Driver Name
Fsfilter2.sys- MD5
9e91e55c89f9c17c0a2acaf4376cd72b- SHA1
e466c5475b0a80f031772730861d5a8f8b1bf255- SHA256
4b36b6f6cda5ececab3eda3d72f0ff3585d07306aa4432cf0af79b5cfd73a343- Imphash
ab7801caf39f7703a52354de80bb983f- Vhash
035086555d65561655151iz66xz- Authentihash
dc6182922de6d3eff627caf3f5153bfd05f5db30b153b93b1b60d886bbc1d98c- Rich PE header hash
1c1ded6dcb968ef382de2faa98c2c729- SSDEEP
6144:BpRceQtt3Usi3h3wvYRjCkC+J2KuIQ1A1V:14t3UV3w6jkhKBuIV- TLSH
T152641947E6AA10F5D8B6D1748593722BFA703C5583309BDB97904A231F237E0AD3E798- Signer
Microsoft Windows Hardware Compatibility Publisher- Signing date
2020-11-10 03:00- SpcSpOpusInfo
Shanghai Fangye Network Technology Co., Ltd.- VT detections
30/71- Compilation time
2020-11-09- PDB path
D:\Projects\源码\ColdProtect\x64\Debug\Fsfilter264.pdb- Country submitter
- Italy, Russia
- Flag
- Malicious
Description
A Windows rootkit that loads at boot as a file-system filter driver and cannot be stopped until reboot (no unload function). It protects its own registry key and driver file, redirects browser traffic through an attacker-controlled proxy, and checks in with one of six hard-coded C2 servers every 5–7 seconds to download updates. It also exposes a device (\Device\MyDevice264) that lets user-mode programs kill any process and read, write, or delete files and registry keys with kernel privileges.
Indicators of Compromise:
C2 IPs: 45.248.8[.]212, 103.88.32[.]122, 103.85.86[.]3, 103.60.165[.]145, 110.42.9[.]59, 27.124.40[.]169
C2 ports: TCP 2025, 2136, 2247, 2389, 2467, 2598, 2673, 2781, 2859, 2962
C2 paths: /api/system/getSystemInfo, /api/safe/downfilelist, /driverfile/
Proxy URLs: hxxp://hxtai.mirpac[.]com/api/pac/pacReback.html?key=10073, hxxp://moren.mirpac[.]com/t.txt
Device: \Device\MyDevice264 (symlink MyDriver264)
Marker files: c:\juling.console, c:\config.pac