Fsfilter2.sys
- Driver Name
Fsfilter2.sys- MD5
179ca82f2e523be47df0dcebe808408d- SHA1
f4ebbb7e07d4af668bd8499d474f448f5d3e1ed7- SHA256
4ce7a50de744d674da85a5713564197646b3ae348cf5278784670a5a745fb9c2- Imphash
ab7801caf39f7703a52354de80bb983f- Vhash
016096555d65761656651iz66xz- Authentihash
673558926a1ae551c31fdf7b39699b184221c9193d892d4f2754e04287d6884f- Rich PE header hash
be0bb9f89ea53793d8cdee9cc42ae2a7- SSDEEP
24576:hDIKq8KTRkyLdmjI8/hkscmJqd5lemNi83VccQF0RMF+5YEg6Z:hpNadmjIQycJA5lemNiIcx0RM08g- TLSH
T18265BFE9A25533ACC07AC434C523B91AF171390D47B696EBB2D27A603BA76E0DD35F40- Signer
Microsoft Windows Hardware Compatibility Publisher- Signing date
2020-12-24 11:20- SpcSpOpusInfo
Shanghai Fangye Network Technology Co., Ltd.- VT detections
41/72- Compilation time
2020-12-21- PDB path
E:\ColdProtect\x64\Debug\Fsfilter264.pdb- Country submitter
- Russia
- Flag
- Malicious
Description
A Windows rootkit that loads at boot as a file-system filter driver and cannot be stopped until reboot (no unload function). It protects its own registry key and driver file, redirects browser traffic through an attacker-controlled proxy, and checks in with one of six hard-coded C2 servers every 5–7 seconds to download updates. It also exposes a device (\Device\MyDevice264) that lets user-mode programs kill any process and read, write, or delete files and registry keys with kernel privileges.
Indicators of Compromise:
C2 IPs: 45.248.8[.]212, 103.88.32[.]122, 103.85.86[.]3, 103.60.165[.]145, 110.42.9[.]59, 27.124.40[.]169
C2 ports: TCP 2025, 2136, 2247, 2389, 2467, 2598, 2673, 2781, 2859, 2962
C2 paths: /api/system/getSystemInfo, /api/safe/downfilelist, /driverfile/
Proxy URLs: hxxp://hxtai.mirpac[.]com/api/pac/pacReback.html?key=10073, hxxp://moren.mirpac[.]com/t.txt
Device: \Device\MyDevice264 (symlink MyDriver264)
Marker files: c:\juling.console, c:\config.pac