DefensXClient.sys
- Driver Name
DefensXClient.sys- MD5
a073ae84043e7acf21c7e6ad6e96a7d5- SHA1
38b6d3ecff57ddfec1cf7be56c5ba6f9c8e425e8- SHA256
913827bf84cfc87e2f0d96d5c9348cd536d82745c212dc4ef858d4934e5e2a72- Imphash
d75298cc05b38d0e9000492ecac28572- Vhash
095086655d55565655155izd2xz- Authentihash
47fc0120d23948bb67669fcb89ed0f75c432db67f440bb0948023d5277c2a458- Rich PE header hash
0bd4d7f97e866a9bfc7927b450bc9ca7- SSDEEP
12288:24U/XXj2IhHC+hijC6Ao2BSWyrXQpHDD9LBwRoRSmc:24MD2SHC+sjC6Ao26rgpHDh86O- TLSH
T153256D47EABC00A9E1A6D678C3D5E923F67B780B0371D6DB0A6096512F137E1A73D321- Signer
Microsoft Windows Hardware Compatibility Publisher- Signing date
2026-10-27 12:43- SpcSpOpusInfo
成都彩程软件设计有限公司; 上海寻梦信息技术有限公司; 华义控股(北京)有限公司; 郑州谦翔信息技术有限公司; 上海信数科技有限公司; 福州熵合驱动科技有限公司; 广州思迈特软件有限公司; 汇智道晟(杭州)软件有限公司; 重庆云联融智科技有限公司; 播氪(杭州)软件有限公司; 东方瀚宇科技有限公司- VT detections
0/72- Compilation time
2026-10-27- PDB path
D:\go\src\DeFenseXAdmin\bin\DefensXClient.pdb- Country submitter
- China
- Flag
- Malicious
Description
AV/EDR blinding rootkit. it runs a dedicated loop that enumerates every registered process-create, thread-create and load-image notify routine plus every registry callback, excludes its own, and unregisters the rest — repeating every 100 ms. Alongside that it has process termination, WFP traffic modification, file-system interception with path redirection, and a plugin loader.