82c4b0ad.sys
- Driver Name
82c4b0ad.sys- MD5
0ed494e67f6c040868f5dce3920a04d0- SHA1
178f1046eeaa5c9da97aaeeb074dc37e70e95bf1- SHA256
c24e5ddb4bafca38510ffeb882eb7117f8c24b7801292022e1908d4c85579723- Imphash
48f439d032750c22223613837bd0e50d- Vhash
016096551d65761656651iz4bxz- Authentihash
516a1802b5513653ec61cff7105dc0e4e6aa48d11aae35191b1df0d49f4a35f9- Rich PE header hash
11a1a09d106315db1dfafb60ef2a5f1d- SSDEEP
24576:JUkyhoPfv7z62XUSRY0Pon5bkJ5By7quUUb2zDLap1QP39fww:JP8QvbJa0au5Bcqp7nmp1QPh- TLSH
T1C155BF9A629433ACC02EC074C823B915F2F5711D0BB59BEB72D7FEC12B679A0D915B02- Signer
Microsoft Windows Hardware Compatibility Publisher- Signing date
2021-01-06 02:29- SpcSpOpusInfo
Shanghai Fangye Network Technology Co., Ltd.- VT detections
41/72- Compilation time
2021-01-05- PDB path
E:\ColdProtect-2\x64\Debug\Fsfilter264.pdb- Country submitter
- China
- Flag
- Malicious
Description
A Windows rootkit that loads at boot as a file-system filter driver and cannot be stopped until reboot (no unload function). It protects its own registry key and driver file, redirects browser traffic through an attacker-controlled proxy, and checks in with one of six hard-coded C2 servers every 5–7 seconds to download updates. It also exposes a device (\Device\MyDevice264) that lets user-mode programs kill any process and read, write, or delete files and registry keys with kernel privileges.